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By SHERRY LYNN MURPHY*
HAVE YOU EVER wondered why restaurants make up ridiculous
songs to sing "happy birthday" to customers? No one knows the words
or melodies, so no one sings along. Why do restaurants do this, in-
stead of just singing the "Happy Birthday to You" song that everyone
knows and loves, the one every kid has sung to him or her at birthday
parties? The reason is because it is illegal for restaurants, in fact for
anyone, to sing "Happy Birthday to You" unless a royalty fee is paid for
permission to use the song.1 Although the song is an important part
of American popular culture, it is also copyrighted, and its owner AOL
Time Warner is entitled to a royalty fee whenever it is sung or played.2
When originally published in 1935, 3 the song had a copyright
term of fifty-six years, and therefore would have been in the public
domain after 1991. 4 However, as copyright law now exists, after the
most recent copyright term extension of 1998, the "Happy Birthday to
You" song will be protected by copyright until the year 2030.5 This
* Class of 2004. Thanks to my husband Andrew for his tireless support and to my
editor Javier Lavagnino for always believing in this piece.
1. See Lyle V. Harris, Singing Different Tune on Birthdays, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
23, 2000, at 2C; see alsoJonathan Zittrain, Calling off the Copyright War in Battle of Property vs.
Free Speech, No One Wins, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 2002, at D12 (describing how the owners
of this copyright threatened to sue the Girl Scouts for using the "Happy Birthday to You"
song at their campfires).
2. See SNOPES.COM, HAPPY BIRTHDAY, WE'LL SUE, at http://www.snopes.com/music/
songs/birthday.htm (last accessed Sept. 28, 2003). The song collects about $2 million in
royalties annually. Id.
3. Nancy Watkins .... and Many More, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2003, at C9 ("Happy
birthday to you, happy bir-oops, better stop now on advice of our attorneys.").
4. See SNOPES.COM, supra note 2.
5. See Watkins, supra note 3, at C9.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
lengthening of copyright terms for works such as the "Happy Birthday
to You" song resulted from the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
("CTEA"), which extended the terms of all copyrights by twenty
years. 6
Exclusive copyright property rights are given by the government
to authors and artists to protect their original expressive works for a
fixed period of time.7 After the expiration of that period of time, the
works fall into the public domain for everyone to use.8 The extension
of copyright terms retroactively is a one-sided modification of the
terms of this grant. Accordingly, these retroactive extensions given by
the CTEA were challenged as unconstitutional in Eldred v. Ashcrofl.9
This Note will expose and analyze the Supreme Court's holding
in Eldred, both in terms of copyright law and in terms of congressional
power to enact legislation under Article I of the Constitution.10 Part I
gives the basic background necessary to understand the issues and rea-
soning in Eldred, including an explanation of the enumerated powers
of Congress under Article I, a comparison of copyright law to that of
other forms of intellectual property, and some history of copyright
term extensions. Part II presents the Eldred case itself, including the
lower court history, the Supreme Court's majority rationale, and the
two dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the holding of the case, what
it means for copyright law, and what it means for Article I
jurisprudence.
Part III points out that the holding in Eldred gives great deference
to Congress to enact retroactive extensions of copyrights. Instead of
answering some very tough questions on interpreting the Copyright
Clause, the Court majority simply accepted the judgment of Congress.
This heavy deference gives Congress unlimited power to enact copy-
right term extensions, at the peril of the public domain. However, the
6. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act §§ 101, 102, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000)).
7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106, 302, 304.
8. However, it is possible that works may still be protected by another form of intel-
lectual property, e.g. trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1059 (2000).
9. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For a short, entertaining, and obviously anti-CTEA account
of how the CTEA was enacted, see Bill Haltom, Micky vs. The Ghost of Sonny Bono, 39 TENN.
BAR J. 38 (2003) ("Sonny got the new law enacted, effectively keeping Mickey under the
exclusive control of the Walt Disney Company until 2024, enabling Disney CEO Michael
Eisner to sing to Mickey, 'I got you, babe!' Suffice to say that when it came to Mickey
Mouse, Sonny did not feel that Walt Disney should have to Cher and Cher alike.").
10. Eldred also addressed the issue of whether the CTEA violated the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech provision. See infra note 116. This is a separate issue from the one
this Note addresses.
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two dissenting opinions are also not persuasive in arguing against the
constitutionality of the CTEA because they are not careful to distin-
guish copyright jurisprudence from that of patents.
Curiously, the majority opinion in Eldred is couched not on the
Copyright Clause in isolation, but on Article I powers in general, in-
cluding the Commerce Clause. This seems to be a deliberate use of
terms by Justice Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion, who
had dissented recently in both United States v. Lopez' I and United States
v. Morrison,12 which raised the standard of review of congressional leg-
islation under the Commerce Clause, another congressional Article I
power. It is interesting that the Court in Eldred declined to follow that
trend. Indeed, it seems that the language used in the Eldred opinion
has brought that trend to an end.
I. Background
A. The Enumerated Powers of Congress Under Article I of the
Constitution
The United States federal government has specific enumerated
powers, and the legislative branch can pass laws only if specifically au-
thorized by the Constitution.13 Furthermore, it is the duty of the judi-
ciary to ensure that Congress legislates within the bounds of its
enumerated powers.1 4 If a law is unconstitutional, the judiciary must
strike it down under the basic understanding that "a law repugnant to
the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.' 15
Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution contains the enumer-
ated powers of Congress to enact legislation.1 6 Among those enumer-
ated powers are the Tax Clause,17 which gives Congress the power to
collect taxes, the Commerce Clause, 18 which gives Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce, and the Patent and Copyright
11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
13. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
14. Id.
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To .... "); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 412 (1819).
17. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises").
18. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("regulate Commerce .. .among the several States").
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Clause, 19 which gives Congress to power to grant patent and copyright
protection.
1. The Recent Heightened Standard of Review of Commerce
Clause Legislation Under Article I
A law enacted by Congress can be challenged as beyond Con-
gress's constitutionally enumerated powers. Until recently, the Court's
standard of review of laws passed by Congress consisted of determin-
ing if the law enacted had any "rational basis" relative to the enumer-
ated power under which it was enacted.20 If so, the law would pass
such a constitutional challenge. This was a very deferential standard,
and almost all laws passed constitutional scrutiny.
In the past decade the Supreme Court has been limiting congres-
sional powers under the Commerce Clause of Article I of the Constitu-
tion, starting with United States v. Lopez,21 which held the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional. 22 The Court announced
that, absent a direct regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, the proper test to determine if Congress is act-
ing pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause is to determine
whether the regulations "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 23
The majority in Lopez explained that "limitations on the com-
merce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce
Clause."2 4 The power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce
Clause is "subject to outer limits," and it is for the Court to enforce
those limits. 25 The majority in Lopez feared that if unchecked, congres-
sional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause could easily es-
calate to unlimited power, contrary to the framers' intent, because
"depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon
as commercial." 26
The dissent in Lopez disagreed sharply with the majority and ar-
gued that the standard of review should remain whether Congress had
19. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries").
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
21. 514 U.S. 549.
22. Id. at 551.
23. See id. at 558-59.
24. Id. at 553.
25. Id. at 557.
26. Id. at 565.
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a "rational basis" for enacting the statute in question. 27 The dissent
predicted that "today's decision may be seen as only a misstep, its rea-
soning and its suggestions not quite in gear with the prevailing stan-
dard, but hardly an epochal case."28
However, contrary to the dissent's prediction in Lopez, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Morrison29 followed the same reasoning
when it struck down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as be-
yond Congress's Commerce Clause power.30 Like the Act in question
in Lopez, the Court held that the purpose of the Act in Morrison was
too attenuated from interstate commerce. 31 The Court recognized
that a congressional act is given a "presumption of constitutionality,"32
however, "[u] nder our written Constitution... the limitation of con-
gressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace."33 This
marked an end to the Court's expansion of congressional deference
in the latter half of the twentieth century.34
There were still sharp disagreements among the Justices in Morri-
son, with the same 5-4 rift in the Court that was found in Lopez, and
with the same Justices on the respective sides of the decisions.35 The
majority opinions of both cases, which announced and supported the
heightened standard of review, included Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. The dissenters, who felt the rational basis standard of review
should survive, included Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Gins-
burg.3 6 Again, the dissent in Morrison opined that it "doubt[ed] that
the majority's view will prove to be enduring law." 37
The Lopez and Morrison cases are known for their promotion of
federalism, i.e., the States' right to self-governance and to be left alone
27. Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 614-15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
30. See id. The Court also held that the Act was beyond Congress's powers under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
31. See id. at 615.
32. Id. at 607.
33. Id. at 616. In contrast to the legislation at issue in Lopez, here Congress had accu-
mulated a "mountain of data" showing the effect of gender-motivated violence on inter-
state commerce. Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, that did not prevent
the law from being held unconstitutional.
34. See id. at 607-08.
35. See id.; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550.
37. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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by the federal government. 38 Upon striking down the federal laws at
issue, the Court declared a new standard of review: "The Court was
deciding whether such a law could be properly enacted by Congress,
whatever the Court's (or anyone else's) opinion of the social policy
embedded in such a law might be."'39 Congress could only regulate
"activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," 40 and the
Court would strike down any legislation that went beyond that enu-
merated power. This Note's comparison of Lopez and Momson with
Eldred is a comparison of the two standards of review, not of the effect
of Eldreds standard of review on federalism.
2. Congress's Enumerated Power in Eldred v. Ashcroft: The
Copyright Clause
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court was faced with defining
the limits of another enumerated power of Congress under Article I
of the Constitution, the Copyright Clause. The Clause provides for
copyright protection by allowing Congress to grant "Authors" an "ex-
clusive Right" for "limited Times" to their "Writings."'41 The Court in
Eldred had to determine if retroactive extensions of existing copyrights
under the CTEA were within the enumerated power of Congress
under the Copyright Clause.
Unlike the Commerce Clause, which has an implicit limitation, 42
the Copyright Clause has the explicit limitation, "for limited Times,"
included in the text of the Clause.43 Petitioners in Eldred attacked the
constitutionality of the retroactive extensions of existing copyrights
under the CTEA, which extended all terms of copyrights by twenty
years.44 This Note examines the scope of the Article I powers granted
to Congress under the Copyright Clause in the wake of Eldred.
38. See Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 433, 434
(2002) (arguing that liberals should support the growth of states' rights through
federalism).
39. Id.
40. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act §§ 101, 102, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000)).
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B. Copyright Law Compared to Other Intellectual Property Under
Article I of the Constitution
In order to understand the differences in the reasoning used by
the majority and dissents in Eldred, it is necessary to understand the
different types of intellectual property. There are three main types of
intellectual property rights granted by Congress: copyright, patent,
and trademark. All three vary in what they protect, how long the pro-
tection lasts, and how they are treated by courts. Patents, copyrights,
and trademarks all arise under Article I of the Constitution. Patent
and copyright rights are granted under the Copyright Clause (Section
8, Clause 8), and trademark rights are granted through the Com-
merce Clause (Section 8, Clause 2) .45
As explained above, copyright protection under the Copyright
Clause is given to "Authors" for their "Writings."46 Copyright protec-
tion is provided by Congress under Title 17 of the United States Code
to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed." 47 This includes literary, mu-
sical, choreographic, pictoral, and sculptural works, motion pictures,
sound recordings, and architectural works.48 Copyright rights do not
cover "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery."4 9
The other form of intellectual property rights that arises under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, is patent protection granted to "Inven-
tors" for their "Discoveries." 50 Despite their comingling in the text of
the Copyright Clause, patents and copyrights have developed into very
different forms of intellectual property. The most common form of
patents, utility patents, 51 have fixed terms of twenty years from the
application filing date. 52 This is considerably shorter than copyrights,
which can easily last for more than a century.53 Also, inventors have to
45. See supra Part I.A.
46. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
48. See id.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
50. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
51. See I DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTA-
BILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT, glossary G1-23 (2002) ("A utility patent is the normal
type of patent issued for a new, useful and nonobvious machine, manufacture, composi-
tion of matter, or process.").
52. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
53. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304.
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apply to a government agency for patents, 54 while copyright rights
arise automatically when an original work of authorship is created and
fixed in some tangible form. 55
A patent is normally for an invention that solves a particular prob-
lem. In fact, one of the requirements to obtain a patent is that the
invention must be "useful. '56 The often-cited Supreme Court case of
Graham v. John Deere Co.,57 for example, involved the invention of a
"Clamp for vibrating Shank Plows." 58 The information detailed in the
patent, the way the "Clamp" was created and used, was the intellectual
property of the patent holder for the patent term. In theory, if the
inventor had not thought of this idea for a better clamp, someone else
would have thought of it eventually, if it was truly useful. The quid pro
quo in patent law is the information given by the inventor to the pub-
lic in exchange for the inventor having a temporary monopoly on its
use.
5 9
In contrast to patents, copyright protection explicitly does not ex-
tend to a design that is "useful. ' 60 A copyright is granted on an artful
expression, such as a novel or a movie.6 1 It is the expression, not the
informative content, that is copyrighted, and the underlying ideas or
facts of the work may be used freely.6 2 For example, when a historian
writes a book on the Civil War, his particular way of organizing and
presenting the facts of the battles is copyrighted, but not the facts
themselves that he uncovers during his research.6 3 Those facts are
freely available for use by other authors in their own style of
presentation. 64
54. The United States Patent and Trademark Office is empowered to grant patents.
See 35 U.S.C. § 1.
55. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression
when . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
56. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Other requirements include that the invention be novel, id.
§ 102, nonobvious, id. § 103(a), and of a patentable subject matter, id. § 101.
57. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
58. Id. at 4. Two other cases were consolidated into the Graham case: Calmar, Inc. v.
Cook Chemical Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., both involving "a finger-
operated sprayer with a 'hold-down' cap." See id.
59. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 113; id. § 101 (defining a "useful article" as one "having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information").
61. See id. § 102(a).
62. See id. § 102(b); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
63. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51.
64. See id.
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There is another type of intellectual property that arises under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution-trademarks. 65 Trade-
marks serve to identify what source a product comes from. 66 Trade-
marks are measured by their association with the company they
represent, but theoretically the term is limitless. 67 Because federal
trademark law arises under the Commerce Clause, a company can
only register a federal trademark if it does business in interstate
commerce.
68
When reading the Eldred majority and the two dissenting opin-
ions, it is important to keep in mind that the three main types of intel-
lectual property are very different in character. Accordingly, in all
three opinions, the use of patent law precedent, while admittedly
somewhat relevant, does not support the Court's reasoning in this
case dealing specifically with copyright law. Of course, this may be one
of the reasons why the Court's opinion does not refer to the Copy-
right Clause, but Article I generally. 69
C. Some History of Copyright Term Extensions
The original copyright statute passed by Congress in 1790 pro-
vided a copyright term of fourteen years, plus an additional fourteen
years if the author was a living United States citizen, for works "already
printed" and "thereafter made and composed. ' 70 This statute marked
the beginning of federal copyright protection, giving protection to
"maps, charts, and books," and extending protection to those works
that were already created. 71 However, this protection of works already
in existence should not be mistaken as a retroactive extension of copy-
right protection, for no federal protection existed prior to this statute.
Congress has periodically extended the copyright term, giving
longer and longer terms of protection to copyright owners. The Act of
1831 added another fourteen years to the initial term, for a total of
forty-two years (twenty-eight years for initial term plus fourteen years
renewal term) .72 The 1831 Act also extended the terms of existing
copyrights not yet expired, marking the first time Congress retroac-
65. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (Lanham Act §§ 1-45) (2000).
66. See id. § 1127 (Lanham Act § 45).
67. See id. § 1059 (Lanham Act § 9).
68. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-97 (1879).
69. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003).
70. See Act of May 31, 1790, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 124-125.
71. See id.
72. SeeAct of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
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tively extended existing copyrights. 73 Thus, instead of simply naming a
new term for future copyrights, existing copyright terms were also ex-
tended. This was a one-sided modification of the exchange betweeen
the authors and the government. The Act of 1909 added another four-
teen years to the renewal term, for a total of fifty-six years (twenty-
eight years for initial term plus twenty-eight years renewal term).7 4
Again, this extension had retroactive application to existing works
protected by copyright.7 5 The 1909 Act also expanded the types of
works protectable under copyright. 76
Between 1962 and 1974 Congress passed nine more laws that in-
crementally extended existing copyright terms, all with retroactive ef-
fect.77 The sole purpose of the first eight of those acts was to
retroactively extend the copyright terms of works about to enter the
public domain (i.e. no effect on future copyrights); the ninth also in-
cluded provisions for willful infringement penalties. 78
The Copyright Act of 1976 altered the way the term of a copyright
was computed, setting the term to be the lifetime of the author plus
fifty years. 79 When there is no identifiable author, the term was the
earlier of seventy-five years from the year of publication or one hun-
dred years from the year of creation.80 Existing copyright terms were
73. See id. § 16.
74. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
75. See id. § 24.
76. See id. § 5.
77. See Act of Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555; Act of Aug. 28, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581; Act of Nov. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464; Act
ofJuly 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397; Act of Dec. 16, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147,
83 Stat. 360; Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441; Act of Nov. 24, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490; Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Act
of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. I, § 104, 88 Stat. 1873.
78. SeeAct of Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (preventing expiration of
existing copyrights before December 31, 1965); Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-142,
79 Stat. 581 (preventing expiration of existing copyrights before December 31, 1967); Act
of Nov. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (preventing expiration of existing copy-
rights before December 31, 1968); Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397
(preventing expiration of existing copyrights before December 31, 1969); Act of Dec. 16,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Star. 360 (preventing expiration of existing copyrights before
December 31, 1970); Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441 (preventing
expiration of existing copyrights before December 31, 1971); Act of Nov. 24, 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (preventing expiration of existing copyrights before December 31,
1972); Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181 (preventing expiration of
existing copyrights before December 31, 1974); Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573,
tit. I, §§ 101-104, 88 Stat. 1873 (preventing expiration of existing copyrights before De-
cember 31, 1976).
79. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302, 305, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76.
80. See id.
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also extended to give a total term of seventy-five years from the date
when copyright was first secured.81 In contrast to the new method of
computing the terms of future copyrighted works, the terms of ex-
isting works did not depend upon the lifetime of the author; the ex-
tension was effected by adding forty-seven years to the end of the
renewal term.82
Finally, under the CTEA passed in 1998,83 all terms of copyrights
were extended by an additional twenty years.84 Now terms of works
copyrighted after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Act)
are computed to be the lifetime of the author plus seventy years, and
ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from
creation (whichever is shorter) for unidentified authors or works for
hire.8 5 The terms of works copyrighted before January 1, 1978 were
extended by changing the renewal term from forty-seven to sixty-seven
years.8 6
A large supporter and heavy lobbyer of the extensions was the
Walt Disney Corporation; their early clips of Mickey Mouse were due
to enter the public domain in 2004.87 Ironically, Congressman Sonny
Bono did not live to see the bill that bears his name pass in both
houses, and President Clinton sign it into law, all in October of
1998.88
Though the CTEA applied to both newly-created and existing
works,8 9 the copyright term extension debate focuses on the retroac-
81. See id. § 304.
82. See id.
83. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000)).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
85. See id. §§ 302, 304. "Works for hire" are creations made under, for example, an
employment agreement. See id. § 101.
86. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 304).
87. Amy Harmon, A Corporate Victory, But One That Raises Public Consciousness, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A24 ("In 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was
passed with hardly any debate after heavy lobbying by the Walt Disney Company, whose
early Mickey Mouse movies were about to fall into the public domain."); Sabra Chartrand,
Congress Has Extended Its Protection for Goofy, Gershwin and Some Moguls of the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at C2 ("Mickey Mouse, first copyrighted in 1928, had been set to pass
into the public domain in 2004; Pluto, Goofy and Donald Duck would have followed in
2009.").
88. See Bernard Weinraub, Sonny Bono, 62, Dies in Skiing Accident, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1998, at A16; Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 287, 291-92 (2002).
89. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
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tive extensions. 90 No one who testified before Congress in support of
the CTEA's enactment had argued in support of prospective exten-
sions of copyrights, even though the CTEA's opponents argued
against them.9 1 Those interested in copyright extensions seemed only
to be concerned with extending their existing rights. 9
2
H. The Case: Eldred v. Ashcroft
A. The Parties
The petitioners in Eldred were Eric Eldred of Eldritch Press and
others who use, copy, reprint, perform, enhance, restore and/or sell
works of art, film, or literature in the public domain. 9 3 Petitioners had
prepared to use works created before 1923 that, but for the CTEA,
would have entered the public domain.94
Petitioners had the support of such amici groups as The Ameri-
can Association of Law Libraries, Constitutional Law Professors, Copy-
right Law Professors, Intellectual Property Law Professors, a group of
top economists, the National Writers Union, and the Organization of
American Historians. 9 5 Counsel for petitioners included lead counsel
Lawrence Lessig of Stanford and Charles Nesson of Harvard. 9 6 How-
ever, petitioners also had a number of opponents, including amici
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Songwriters
Guild of America, Symphonic and Concert Composers, the Recording
Industry Association of America, the Motion Picture Association of
America, AOL Time Warner, and Dr. Seuss Enterprises.9 7
The respondent was John D. Ashcroft, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States.98 Mr. Ashcroft succeeded Janet
Reno as the Attorney General listed in the previous tides of the case in
the district and appellate courts.9 9 Solicitor General Theodore Olson
represented Mr. Ashcroft before the Court. 10 0
90. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I Stayed Too
Long?, "52 FLA. L. REv. 989, 991 (2000).
91. See id. at 996-97.
92. See id.
93. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999).
94. See id.
95. See OPENLAW, ELDRED V. ASHCROFT, CERT GRANTED: THE COURT WILL HEAR ELDRED
v. ASHCROFT IN ITS FALL TERM, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/
legal.html (last accessed Jan. 28, 2004).
96. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 191.
97. See OPENAW, supra note 95.
98. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
99. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1.
100. See Eldred 537 U.S. at 191.
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B. Procedural History
1. United States District Court, District of Columbia: Eldred v.
Reno
In the district court, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment
that section 102(d) (1) (B) of the CTEA was unconstitutional. 10 1 The
district court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, 10 2 holding that Congress had the power under the Copyright
Clause to define "limited Times" and extend copyright terms under
the CTEA.10 3 The court concluded that any fixed term is a limited
time within the discretion of Congress because it is not perpetual' 0 4
and that Congress has the power to apply retroactive extensions under
the Copyright Clause.10 5
2. United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit: Eldred v. Reno
On appeal, the district court's ruling was affirmed. 0 6 The appel-
late court held that Congress did not violate the "limited Times" provi-
sion of the Copyright Clause by enacting retroactive extensions in the
CTEA.10 7 The court also held that the preamble to the Copyright
Clause, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," does
not limit congressional power.' 08 Even taking the preamble into con-
sideration, the court reasoned that extending copyrights promotes the
restoration of old works that would otherwise disappear when surren-
dered to the public domain, and therefore does promote progress.' 0 9
The dissenting justice on the panel pointed out that congres-
sional powers are subject to outer limits under Lopez." 0 The dissent
argued that Congress only has the power to grant copyrights to pro-
mote progress."' Therefore, the extension of rights previously se-
cured are not authorized under the Copyright Clause. 1 12 Congress
must promote progress in order to legislate under the Copyright
101. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
102. See id. at 2.
103. See id. at 3.
104. See id. at 3 n.7.
105. See id. at 3.
106. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 377-78.
109. See id. at 379.
110. See id. at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
111. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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Clause, and this retroactive term extension does not.113 A rehearing
and rehearing en banc were denied. 114
C. The Case: Eldred v. Ashcroft
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Con-
gress had the authority to grant retroactive extensions of existing
copyrights under the Copyright Clause." 5 The Court decided that
Congress was indeed acting within its constitutional authority. 116
1. Petitioners' Contentions
Petitioners argued that the CTEA's blanket retroactive extension
of existing copyright terms exceeded Congress's power under the
Copyright Clause."17 They claimed that the enumerated powers of
Congress are limited, and that those limits are subject to judicial de-
termination." 8 In addition, under the "limited Times" provision of
the Copyright Clause, there must be some "stopping point" for copy-
right terms, 1 9 and the Court must draw that line.' 20 Petitioners
pointed out that Congress had extended copyright terms eleven times
in the past forty years, leading indirectly to a perpetual term under
"the installment plan."' 21 Thus, petitioners felt the Court should fi-
nally stop Congress from continuously extending existing copyright
terms and preventing works from entering the public domain.
Furthermore, they argued that retroactive extensions cannot pro-
mote progress because they do not require the creation of new works
in return. 12 2 The Court must give effect to the limitations of the Copy-
right Clause in order to promote progress, and not allow Congress to
113. See id. at 383 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
114. See Eldred v. Reno, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
115. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003).
116. Id. The Court also granted certiorari to answer the question of whether the CTEA,
as held by the lower court, was "categorically immune from challenge[ ] under the First
Amendment." See id. This Note only addresses the first certified question, whether Con-
gress has the power to retroactively extend copyright terms. The Court held that copyright
laws were not categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny, but existing copyright
law provides adequate safeguards so as to not encroach on the First Amendment. See id. at
219-20.
117. See Brief for Petitioners at 11, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618).
118. See id. at 12.
119. Id. at 13.
120. See id. at 14.
121. See id. at 18.
122. See id. at 10.
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freely give copyright extensions with no benefit to the public. 123
There is no exchange with retroactive extensions of copyright terms;
rather, the government is simply giving a longer monopoly to the cop-
yright owner and depriving the public of that work for a longer period
of time.124
Finally, petitioners argued that the CTEA should be deemed un-
constitutional in its entirety because the CTEA's prospective and ret-
roactive extensions of copyright terms are inseverable. 125 They are
inseverable because CTEA does not discriminate by its terms between
copyrights created before and after the law took effect.126
2. Respondent's Contentions
The respondent argued that the "limited Times" requirement in
the Copyright Clause does not preclude Congress from applying new
copyright terms to future and existing copyrights.12 7 In fact, each time
Congress had previously extended the copyright term, it had applied
the extension to both future and existing copyrights, so that previous
authors enjoyed the same protections as future authors. 128 The Court
should give deference to this repeated application by Congress. 129 In
contrast to Lopez, federalism and separation of powers issues were not
present here, so there should be no heightened standard of review.1 30
The respondent explained that the phrase "limited Times" does
not mean a single, inalterable, limited time, and petitioners had con-
ceded this.131 Petitioners had also admitted that the CTEA term does
not violate the "limited Times" provision for future copyrights. 132 If
the CTEA term was "limited" as to future works, it was necessarily "lim-
ited" for previous works.1 33
Respondent felt that petitioners' construction of the "limited
Times" provision in light of the preamble of the Copyright Clause,
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 47.
126. See id. at 48.
127. See Brief for Respondent at 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618).
128. See id.
129. See id. at 6.
130. See id. at 27 n.18; see also discussion supra Part I.A.1.
131. See Brief for Respondent at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618).
132. See id. at 9.
133. See id.
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"To promote the Progress," was ill-founded.1 34 While the preamble of
the Copyright Clause explains the overarching purpose of this con-
gressional power, it is not a limitation on its application by Con-
gress. 135 Moreover, extensions encourage authors of existing works to
create more, knowing their creations will be protected for a longer
period of time. 13 6
According to the respondent, concerns about perpetual protec-
tion were unfounded. Congress had only significantly extended the
term five times in the past 210 years. 137 Furthermore, a limited time
extended for a limited time remains a limited time.138 The respon-
dent explained that the CTEA extended copyright terms in order to
better adapt to: 1) the longer commercially viable periods that the
works are profitable for their authors, 2) the longer lifetimes of the
authors and their immediate heirs, and 3) the increasing amounts of
piracy resulting from the advent of new technologies.1
3 9
3. The Court's Rationale: Congressional Power Under the
Copyright Clause Is Given Great Deference
The opinion of the Court was authored by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Thomas. 140 The Court held that Congress did act
within its authority provided by the Copyright Clause when it applied
retroactive extensions to existing copyrights under the CTEA. 141 The
decision of the appellate court was affirmed, and the case was
dismissed.' 42
The Court held that the CTEA did not exceed the bounds of the
"limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause. The Court ex-
plained that the term "limited" as used in the Copyright Clause does
not "command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever
'fixed' or 'inalterable.'" 43 Therefore, Congress can change the finite
time period set for the duration of copyrights whenever they deem it
necessary. As for the petitioners' argument that Congress's habit of
134. See id. at 19.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 31.
137. See id. at 7.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 6-7.
140. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
141. See id. at 222.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 199.
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extending existing copyrights will lead to an infinite term of copyright
protection, the Court followed the reasoning of the appellate court
and stated, "a regime of perpetual copyrights 'clearly is not the situa-
tion before us.' "144
The Court went further and explained the bounds of the Copy-
right Clause on congressional legislation: "[W]e have described the
Copyright Clause as 'both a grant of power and a limitation,' and have
said that '[t]he primary objective of copyright' is '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science. '145 "The 'constitutional command,' we have rec-
ognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all,
create [s] a 'system' that 'promote[s] the Progress of Science.' 1 46 The
Court then "defer[red] substantially to Congress" on whether the
CTEA "is a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by
the Copyright Clause" as part of Congress's copyright "system.' 1 47
The Court felt that they were "not at liberty to second-guess con-
gressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however
debatable or arguably unwise they may be."148 "[I]t is generally for Con-
gress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause's objectives."1 49 Giving a surprising amount of deference to
Congress, the Court stated that "[t] he wisdom of Congress' [s] action
... is not within our province to second guess." 150
The Court used the rational basis standard of review in its analy-
sis. The Court found a "rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA
'promote[s] the Progress of Science.' ' 1 5 ' Extending their holding to
all Article I powers under the Constitution, the Court stated: 'Judicial
deference to such congressional definition is 'but a corollary to the
grant to Congress of any Article Ipower.'1 52
Petitioners had argued that retroactive extensions of copyright
terms cannot satisfy the quid pro quo requirement of the Copyright
Clause previously recognized in the patent context. In response, the
Court explained that "patents and copyrights do not entail the same
exchange," and the Court has only applied the existing quid pro quo
144. Id. at 209.
145. Id. at 212 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 204-05.
148. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 212.
150. Id. at 222.
151. Id. at 213 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
152. Id. at 218 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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requirement to patent jurisprudence. a53 The quid pro quo in copy-
right law is not as "exacting" as in patent law, 154 and Congress could
have rationally included the benefit of future extensions in exchange
for the works being given copyright rights in their "system" of copy-
right protection. 55
The Court pointed to the history of copyright extensions applied
retroactively to support the constitutionality of the CTEA: "Text, his-
tory, and precedent, we conclude, confirm that the Copyright Clause
empowers Congress to prescribe 'limited Times' for copyright protec-
tion and to secure the same level and duration of protection for all
copyright holders, present and future.' 56 The Court expressed a re-
luctance to invalidate the CTEA because it may have necessarily invali-
dated the 1976 Act as well, which also provided for retroactive
extensions of copyright terms.' 57
4. The Dissent of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that "the majority's [holding]
rests on the mistaken premise that this Court has virtually no role in
reviewing congressional grants of monopoly privileges to authors, in-
ventors and their successors." 158 Justice Stevens felt that limiting the
copyright term was necessary because "the requirement that those ex-
clusive grants be for 'limited Times' serves the ultimate purpose of
promoting the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' by guaranteeing
that those innovations will enter the public domain as soon as the
period of exclusivity expires. ' 159 These "twin purposes" of the Copy-
right Clause-encouraging new works and adding to the public do-
main-apply to both patents and copyrights, and need to be reflected
in congressional legislation. 60 Retroactive extensions of copyright
terms serve neither of those purposes because the works are already in
existence, and by extending their copyright term they are merely pre-
vented from entering the public domain. 161 Justice Stevens argued
that the majority opinion gave Congress free reign to legislate away
any limit on copyright terms: "[T]he majority's reading of Article I,
153. Id. at 216.
154. Id. at 217 n.22.
155. Id. at 214-15.
156. Id. at 199.
157. See id. at 221-22.
158. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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§ 8 . . . [provides] essentially no limit on congressional action under the
Clause." 162
Justice Stevens suggested that, like patent terms, copyright terms
are, in essence, contracts between the artists and the government that
give exclusivity to the artist for a certain period and surrender the
work to the public domain after the term expires. 163 Extensions of
copyright terms are a taking of the remainder interest in the work
from the public, who were to acquire the works once the copyright
terms had ended.164 It is unfair to "mak[e] such a retroactive change
in the public's bargain with an inventor without providing compensa-
tion for the taking."1 65 In addition to that unfairness, "[m]embers of
the public were entitled to rely on a promised access to copyrighted or
patented works at the expiration of the terms specified when the ex-
clusive privileges were granted." 166 Justice Stevens noted the resultant
shrinking of the public domain:
[U]nder the series of extensions to copyrights ... no copyrighted
work created in the past 80 years has entered the public domain or
will do so until 2019. But as our cases repeatedly and consistently
emphasize, ultimate public access is the overriding purpose of the
constitutional provision. Ex post facto extensions of existing copy-
rights, unsupported by any consideration of the public interest,
frustrate the central purpose of the Clause. 167
According to Justice Stevens, the fact that Congress has in the
past applied copyright extensions retroactively does not save the
CTEA from constitutional scrutiny. "[A]s our decision in INS v.
Chadha demonstrates, the fact that Congress has repeatedly acted on a
mistaken interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify our duty
to invalidate an unconstitutional practice when it is finally challenged
in an appropriate case."' 168 The Court has not been afraid in the past
to correct a constitutional violation, "even when that span of time cov-
ers our entire national existence."' 69 Justice Stevens warned that,
"[f] airly read, the Court has stated that Congress' [s] actions under the
162. Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
163. See id. at 225-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
678 (1970)).
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Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes, judicially
unreviewable."'170
Justice Stevens argued that the question of whether the CTEA
violates the "limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause need
not be answered, because the question posed by petitioners was
merely whether Congress could extend the copyright terms retroac-
tively. 17' Nevertheless, "a categorical rule prohibiting retroactive ex-
tensions would effectively preclude perpetual copyrights."'172
5. The Dissent of Justice Breyer
Injustice Breyer's dissenting opinion, the grant of power to Con-
gress under the Copyright Clause is subject to limits, and the CTEA
extension "falls outside them. '173 Justice Breyer felt that the "[t]here
[was] no legitimate, serious copyright-related justification for this
statute."174
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's holding that the
CTEA does not violate the "limited Times" requirement of the Copy-
right Clause. "The economic effect of this 20-year extension-the
longest blanket extension since the Nation's founding-is to make
the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual." 175
Also discussing public policy, Justice Breyer said that the Copy-
right Clause was meant to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.1 76 The copyright term is limited so that the public will
not be permanently deprived of the free use of works of art.177 The
framers of the Constitution were wary of monopolies, and the Consti-
tution was written to allow limited monopolies in only two situations,
for patents and copyrights, but these monopolies were purposefully
only temporary.' 78 James Madison "warned in general that monopo-
lies must be 'guarded with strictness agst abuse."1 79 It was also diffi-
cult for Justice Breyer to imagine that "somehow, somewhere, some
170. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
177. See id. at 246 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quotingjames Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities.
Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments., in WRITINGs 756 (J. Rakove ed., 1999)).
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potential author might be moved by the thought of great-grandchil-
dren receiving copyright royalties a century hence."'180
Justice Breyer did not feel the CTEA even passed a rational basis
standard: "[T] he incentive-related numbers are far too small for Con-
gress to have concluded rationally, even with respect to new works,
that the extension's economic-incentive effect could justify the serious
expression-related harms."18 l In comparing the CTEA's potential ben-
efit to the public with its benefit to copyright holders, Justice Breyer
felt that "the present statute primarily benefits the holders of existing
copyrights, i.e., copyrights on works already created."1 8 2
Il. Analysis
A. Criticism of the Majority's Holding Giving Excessive Deference
to Congress
1. What Is a Limited Time?
The Court in Eldred did not elaborate on the meaning of the "lim-
ited Times" limitation found in the Copyright Clause. The Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause are both enumerated powers of
Congress under Article I, Section 8. The Supreme Court had held in
Lopez that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution has an implicit
limitation. 183 By comparison, the text of the Copyright Clause has an
explicit limitation-rights are given to authors "for limited Times."184
Naturally an explicit limitation should be more apparent and thus
stronger than an implicit limitation, yet the Court did not apply the
heightened standard of review to this explicit limitation. The Court
held in Eldred that a limited time does not mean a "fixed" time. 185 As
for the CTEA embodying Congress's attempt to create a perpetual
copyright, the Court agreed with the appellate court that "a regime of
perpetual copyrights is 'clearly not the situation before us." ' 18 6 This
begs the question, what would be seen by the Court as exceeding a
limited time? The Court's rationale that a period of time that is of a
finite, specified number of years would theoretically apply to a copy-
right term of one thousand years, or even one million years. l8 7
180. Id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199.
186. Id. at 209.
187. See id. at 199.
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Though the CTEA does set a finite duration on copyright terms (at
least until the next extension), where would a line be drawn?
In a footnote, the majority of the Court dismissed the calculation
made by top economists that the CTEA effectively gives 99.8% of a
perpetual copyright term, explaining that the CTEA is no different
from previous extensions in that regard. 18 However, even if that were
true, just because Congress has previously acted without challenge
does not mean they were acting within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion. The footnote ended: "It is doubtful ... that those architects of
our Nation, in framing the 'limited Times' prescription, thought in
terms of the calculator instead of the calendar."'189
Why not? It is more difficult to imagine that the framers intended
"limited Times" to span into the lifetimes of the author's great-
grandchildren. By providing for "limited Times," the framers wanted
the works to, after a reasonable period of time, go into the public
domain for the benefit of everyone. 190 "The primary objective of copy-
right is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.' "191 This cannot be accomplished if
works are prevented from entering the public domain by continuous
retroactive extensions.
It is understandable that the Court did not want to draw a line in
the sand declaring how many years would be too many for a copyright
term, since this is the sort of policy judgment that should be a legisla-
tive decision. However, by failing to hold retroactive copyright exten-
sions unconstitutional, the Court may be forced to do just that in
future cases in order to strike down a law granting five hundred years
retroactively to a copyright term as not being a limited time. But based
on the precedent set by Eldred, the Court will never be able to draw
that line. Copyright law is now subject to unlimited congressional
power. It is entirely within the province of Congress to define what a
limited time is under the Copyright Clause.
2. The Lack of a Rational Basis for Congress Enacting the CTEA
The majority curiously applied the rational basis standard of re-
view, instead of following the trend announced in Lopez and Morrison
of a heightened standard. However, even applying a rational basis
standard of review, the CTEA should not have been held constitu-
188. Id. at 209 n.16.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 223-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
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tional by the Court. The Court's decision that the CTEA was a rational
exercise of congressional power is based upon faulty reasoning.
In passing retroactive copyright extensions, congressional records
indicated that Congress wanted an author who sold his work last week
to be in no worse position than the author who sells his work next
week.192 The argument that this was a rational basis for retroactive
extensions is wholly unconvincing. There is still a disparity among
copyright holders. The author whose copyright term expired last week
cannot take advantage of the copyright extensions, while the copy-
right holder whose term expires next week suddenly received an extra
twenty years of protection.
The majority claimed that copyright owners have an expectation
of future extensions. 193 This argument is not only unconvincing, it is
irrational. The author who sold his work before the CTEA was enacted
had the expectation that the copyright term would span his or her
lifetime plus fifty years, the law that was in effect when the work was
created. He or she most likely did not count on future extensions
when bargaining with the buyer, but counted on the current law. This
fictional expectation of future copyright term extensions cannot be a
"rational basis" for the promotion of progress, because it simply makes
no sense.
The Court reflected on the history of Congress's application of
copyright extensions to future and existing copyrights.1 94 The Court
expressly admitted that "prior to the instant case this Court did not
have occasion to decide whether extending the duration of existing
copyrights complies with the 'limited Times' prescription." 9 5 How-
ever, prior to the end of the twentieth century, the effect of withhold-
ing works from the public domain was far less significant. Nowadays,
in the age of the internet where works in the public domain can be
freely and nearly infinitely disseminated, parties who are deprived of
public works suffer a far greater harm.1 96 The fact that no one has
previously sued on this issue simply cannot prove the validity of the
192. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200.
193. See id. at 215.
194. See id. at 200-01.
195. Id. at 202. The Court went on and applied patent jurisprudence to copyright law,
discussing a prior patent extension. Id. at 203. This contradicts the Court's own prescrip-
tion against the direct comparison of these different types of intellectual property. See id. at
216.
196. Cf Adam P. Segal, Comment, Dissemination of Digitized Music on the Internet: A Chal-
lenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97, 99-100 (1996)
(commenting on how the power of the internet to allow the free flow of works may chal-
lenge the ability of copyright owners of digitized music to protect their rights).
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congressional action in the context of today's technological
developments.
The majority in Eldred relied on "text, history, and precedent. 197
However, the text of the Copyright Clause does not provide for retro-
active extensions, the history of retroactive copyright extensions has
never been challenged in court, and there is no precedent supporting
these extensions, as the Court has admitted. 98 Though the Court in
Eldred seemed reluctant to jeopardize previous copyright extensions
under the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, 199 the Court has not in the past
been afraid to overturn numerous enacted laws with one ruling. In a
previous far-reaching decision, the Court in effect held hundreds of
laws unconstitutional, showing that the Court is not bound to uphold
long-standing congressional practice. 200 The Court was not bound by
history, and was not bound by stare decisis, because the issue had
never before been presented.20' The same should have applied to El-
dred. As well-stated by Justice Stevens: "Though relevant, the history is
not dispositive of the constitutionality of [the CTEA] ."202
The Court majority continuously relied on the fact that the first
copyright act passed by Congress in 1790 applied to preexisting
works.203 However, the Court started its opinion by expressly not de-
ciding whether the "1790 Act must be distinguished from the later
Acts on the ground that it covered existing works but did not extend
existing copyrights."204 This was echoed in Justice Stevens's dissent:
"That [the 1790 Act] applied to works already in existence says noth-
ing about the First Congress' conception of their power to extend this
newly created federal right."20 5 The Court in Eldred simply used this
historical argument to avoid a more thorough analysis of the Copy-
right Clause limitations, and instead deferred heavily to the judgment
of the current Congress.
At the beginning of the opinion, the Court recognized that Con-
gress had only applied copyright extensions to both future and ex-
isting copyrights three times prior to the CTEA: in 1831, 1909, and
197. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199.
198. Id. at 202.
199. Id. at 209-10.
200. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (discussing the impact of the
Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
201. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202.
202. Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 197-98, 200-01, 204, 208, 213-15.
204. Id. at 196 n.3.
205. Id. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
1976.206 The three occurrences in the past two hundred years are
hardly enough to amount to the "unbroken" history the Court heavily
relied upon to uphold the constitutionality of the CTEA.207
It is disappointing that Eldred, which set a dangerous precedent
giving unlimited power to Congress to extend existing copyrights, is
based on faulty and wholly unconvincing reasoning. Nonetheless, the
existence of the public domain is now entirely within the power and
whims of Congress.
B. Criticism of the Dissenting Opinions: The Copyright Clause as
Applied to Copyrights, Not Patents
Though perhaps more convincing than the majority's rationale,
the two dissenting opinions in Eldred were also based on faulty reason-
ing. The majority was at least correct in observing that the grant of
copyright rights does not require the same quid pro quo as patents.208
The major failing of the dissenting opinions in Eldred is that in their
rationales they each blend together two very different forms of intel-
lectual property, patents and copyrights, and blindly apply patent ju-
risprudence to copyrights. By contrast, the majority in Eldred at least
recognized the differences between patents and copyrights, 20 9 though
they also allowed patent jurisprudence to "inform[ ] [their] in-
quiry."210 Since the two entail very different property rights in prac-
tice, they are entitled to different treatment by the law.
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions were wise to stress that the
purpose of the Copyright Clause, for both patents and copyrights, is to
ultimately benefit the public by promoting the creation and disclosure
of these works. 211 The majority opinion stopped short of analyzing
this point and excessively deferred to Congress.21 2 While the Court
should certainly not act as a legislature and decide how to best pro-
mote progress, the Court should still have ensured that Congress was
acting within its constitutional decree.
In the context of patents, the ownership term is limited to twenty
years, 213 which at least seems fair in that the public can get access to
the intellectual property in a reasonable amount of time after the in-
206. Id. at 196.
207. Id. at 200.
208. See id. 216; see also discussion supra Part I.B.
209. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216.
210. Id. at 201.
211. See id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 245-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 204-05.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
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ventor has the chance to profit from his or her innovation. However,
for copyrights, as one commentator has noted, "Congress seems to
have tilted the balance against the interests of the public at large in
favor of authors."2 14 So it has, and copyright law has evolved, for bet-
ter or for worse, for the benefit of copyright owners.
C. Limits on Congressional Article I Powers in the Wake of Eldred
In addition to not providing a well-reasoned opinion to support
the constitutionality of the CTEA, the Court quietly disrupted its re-
cent shift of the standard of review on Article I power. 2 15 This was
done by the Court applying its holding not to the Copyright Clause in
isolation, but to Article I powers in general.
1. The Court's Standard of Review of Article I Powers Reverted
Back to a Rational Basis Analysis
The majority opinion in Eldred gave an excessive amount of defer-
ence to Congress's own interpretation of the Constitution. On
whether the CTEA was "a rational exercise of the legislative authority
conferred by the Copyright Clause," the Court "defer[red] substan-
tially to Congress."2 16 The Court gave Congress the power "to decide
how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives" in order to cre-
ate a "system" that "promote[s] the progress of Science." 2 17
These statements seem to say not just that Congress needs only a
rational basis for this type of legislation, but also that the Court will let
Congress decide whether in fact the basis was rational. The Court also
declared: " [W] e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional deter-
minations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or ar-
guably unwise they may be."218 This suggests that if the Court did care to
decide whether the basis was rational, they may very well have found
that it was not. The dissent also recognized this surprising amount of
deference, saying the majority "rests on the mistaken premise that this
Court has virtually no role in reviewing congressional grants of mo-
nopoly privileges to authors, inventors, and their successors." 2 19 If the
Court is to have any role in interpreting the Constitution, it must de-
214. Sue Ann Mota, Eldred v. Reno-Is the Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional, 12
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 167, 175 (2001).
215. See supra Part I.A.2.
216. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
217. Id. at 212 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
218. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cide whether Congress has acted within its constitutionally-mandated
boundaries. It cannot simply defer to Congress, or Congress will be
able to legislate unchecked, without judicial scrutiny.
Such expansive deference to Congress does not comport with the
Lopez and Morrison opinions. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court not only
made its own determination of whether Congress's legislation was ra-
tional, but it also applied a higher standard: whether the legislation
"substantially affect[ed]" interstate commerce. 220 For the Copyright
Clause, a more parallel standard with which the Court could have re-
viewed Article I powers would be whether the CTEA substantially pro-
motes progress in science and the arts. Of course, if that were the
standard used, retroactive extensions would most certainly not sub-
stantially promote progress in science and the arts, because it merely
gives a windfall to current copyright owners.
The Court may someday feel the need to resurrect the seemingly-
forgotten limitation in the Copyright Clause and hold retroactive ex-
tensions of copyrights unconstitutional, perhaps when they do feel
that legislation has effectually created a perpetual copyright term.
However, to do that the Court will have to get past the precedent now
set by Eldred. At present, under Eldred, Congress has boundless author-
ity to extend existing copyrights, at the peril of the growth of the pub-
lic domain.
2. Broad Application of the Standard of Review in the Majority
Opinion to "Article I Powers"-Death of the Heightened
Standard
Writing for the majority of the Court in Eldred was Justice Gins-
burg, who had joined the dissent in both Lopez and Morrison. Joining
Justice Ginsburg in the majority in Eldred was Justice Souter, who had
authored the dissenting opinions in Lopez and Morrison, and who pre-
dicted that the Court's departure from the rational basis standard of
review would be short-lived. His prediction proved correct. As op-
posed to the 5-4 splits in Lopez and Morrison,221 all nine justices in El-
dred agreed to apply a rational basis standard. 222
220. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
222. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204. The dissenting opinion ofJustice Stevens did not specif-
ically state his preferred standard of review, but his arguments were consistent with a ra-
tional basis standard by effectively stating that the majority went beyond a rational basis
standard and adopted a standard of essentially no judicial review. See id. at 223 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting opinion ofJustice Breyer did apply a rational basis standard of
review and argued the standard was not met. See id. at 245, 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Importantly, the majority explained its great deference to Con-
gress, not in terms of the Copyright Clause, but in terms of Article I
powers: 'Judicial deference to such congressional definition is 'but a
corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power. "' 223 Though
the Court did not directly address the Lopez and Morrison precedent, it
was argued in the pleadings by the petitioners and respondent and
was addressed in the appellate court opinion. 224 At the very least, in
applying the rational basis standard to congressional legislation under
Article I of the Constitution,225 Eldred has severely weakened the Lopez
and Morrison precedent.
Conclusion
In Eldred, the Supreme Court upheld the retroactive extension of
copyright terms under the CTEA, finding that they did not violate the
"limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause. However, the
Court's reasoning that any retroactive extension that sets a finite pe-
riod of time is still a limited time sets a dangerous precedent, and
leaves Congress free to retroactively extend a term by any length, even
if that term is one thousand years. The Court should have taken the
opportunity in Eldred to reign in Congress's retroactive extensions of
copyright terms and hold the CTEA unconstitutional.
The Court did reaffirm that the purpose of granting copyrights is
to "promote the Progress of Science," but failed to analyze the CTEA
in light of this goal, giving Congress great deference to legislate under
the Copyright Clause.226 This is a sharp turn from the majority opin-
ions in Lopez and Morrison, where the Court itself decided whether
Congress was "substantially" acting within the authority delegated by
the Constitution.
Even under a rational basis standard of review, the CTEA should
not have been held constitutional. No rational basis was given by the
majority of the court to uphold the CTEA's retroactive extensions.
Only irrational arguments were given, and the CTEA should have
been held unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress to enact
under the Copyright Clause.
223. Id. at 218.
224. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, 11-12, 19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618); Brief for Respondent at 27 n.18, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
225. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
226. Id. at 212.
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By the application of the majority's opinion to Article I powers in
general, the strength of the Lopez and Morrison decisions in reigning in
congressional power to legislate under Article I has been severely
weakened by Eldred, as the Court reverted back to the rational basis
standard of review of Congress's power to legislate. The dissents' pre-
dictions in Lopez and Morrison have proven correct: the heightened
standard is now lost in history. Furthermore, now Congress has free
reign to retroactively extend existing copyrights indefinitely.
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